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Aim of the paper is to discuss the extent to which pragmatics, i.e., the ability to use
language and other expressive means to convey meaning in a specific interactional
context, overlaps with Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe mental states
to oneself and the others. We present empirical data available in the current literature
concerning the relation between these two faculties, with specific reference to the
developmental and clinical domains. Part of the literature we take into account
appears to show that ToM does correlate with pragmatic ability; however, other studies
appear to show that pragmatic ability alone cannot explain the empirical differences
of performance across different kinds of pragmatic tasks, and therefore that another,
at least partially different faculty is required to account for human communication.
We argue that to conceive pragmatics as a sort of subcomponent of ToM, and
thus to conflate or reduce the notion of pragmatics into the (wider) notion of ToM,
is not theoretically correct and a possible cause of methodological confusion in the
relevant empirical research. It thus turns out to be necessary that the two faculties be
investigated with separate theories as well as different experimental tasks.
Keywords: pragmatics, theory of mind, experimental pragmatics, inferential ability, cognitive pragmatics
INTRODUCTION
Pragmatics is a complex theoretical construct for which several definitions have been proposed.
Among others, these include the study of the speaker’s meaning in relation to the use of language,
the relationship between signs and their users, the ability to use language and other expressive
means (like gestures, body movements, facial expressions, and paralinguistic cues) to convey
communicative meanings in a context, the ability to manage conversations, discourse analysis (see
Levinson, 1983; Tirassa, 1999; Mey, 2001; Cummings, 2005; Huang, 2007; Tirassa and Bosco, 2008;
Bara, 2010).
Behind such an array of perspectives, there is unanimous agreement that pragmatic ability
requires a partner more than merely comprehend the literal meaning of an utterance, and that
this involves some kind of inferential processes to fill the gap between what a speaker literally has
said and what she actually meant (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1979; Grice, 1989). The ability to infer the
communicative intention behind an utterance thus is what characterizes human communication.
This is also necessary to distinguish between different possible interpretations of the same literal
act. For example a person might say “What a wonderful day!” for (at least) two reasons: sincerely, if
the sky is blue and the sun is shining, or ironically, if it is cold and rainy. Thus, the same statement
can be sincere, ironic, etc., depending on the context in which it is uttered (Bosco et al., 2004; Bosco
and Bucciarelli, 2008). Other cases where the literal meaning does not correspond to the intended
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meaning are indirect speech acts, e.g., “Can you pass the salt,” or
figurative language, like metaphors (e.g., “Lawyers are sharks”),
idioms (e.g., “To walk in someone else’s shoes”), hyperboles (e.g.,
“She’s a genius,” referring to a brilliant person), and so on.
Theory of Mind (ToM) appears comparatively simpler to
define, at least at first sight. This label was originally coined by
Premack and Woodruff (1978) to refer to the ability to attribute
mental states to oneself and to the others and to use such
attribution to predict and explain behavior. Since then, however,
this originally “single” ability has been decomposed into several
facets or subcomponents, such as first-person and third-person
ToM (i.e., respectively, the ability to understand one’s own beliefs
and those of another person: Nichols and Stich, 2003), affective
ToM and cognitive ToM (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000),
first-order and second-order ToM (i.e., respectively, the ability
to understand someone’s beliefs about a state of the world and
the more complex ability to understand someone’s beliefs about
someone else’s belief: Wimmer and Perner, 1983). We refer
the interested reader to Dimopoulou et al. (2017) for a recent
review of this research area and to Brizio et al. (2015) for ToM
development.
Sperber and Wilson (2002) proposed to view pragmatics as
a sub-module of mind-reading, the latter being in practice a
synonym of ToM. Based on this, several studies have used
pragmatic tasks, defining them as ToM tasks. A clear example
is the Strange Stories test (Happé, 1994), one of the most
used ways to investigate advanced ToM. The test consists of
24 story-items (two for each type) concerning Pretense, Joke,
Lie, White Lie, Appearance/Reality, Double Bluff, Contrary
Emotions, Forgetting, Misunderstanding, Persuasion, Figure of
Speech and Irony; in the field of pragmatics the last four tasks
- Misunderstanding, Persuasion, Figure of Speech and Irony
- would be considered examples of pragmatic tasks. A token
example of Strange Story is: Ann’s mother has spent a long time
cooking Ann’s favorite meal, fish and chips. But when she brings it
to Ann, she is watching TV, and she doesn’t even look up, or say
thank you. Ann’s mother is cross and says “Well, that’s very nice,
isn’t it! That is what I call politeness!” The subject is asked “Is
it true what Ann’s mother says?” and “Why does Ann’s mother
say this?” The item is considered passed if both questions are
answered correctly.
In our view this story involves both pragmatic competence,
dealing with language and its use in the given context, and
TOM competence, dealing with the mental states that may
help explain such use of language. A correlation between a
purely pragmatic task and the Strange Stories could then be
explained either with a purely pragmatic faculty (if the second
question is conceived of as focusing on language use) or an
overlap or synergy of pragmatic and TOM abilities (if the
second question is viewed as a TOM question independent of
language use). Under no respect should it count as evidence that
pragmatics straightforwardly identifies with TOM. It could be no
coincidence that validating Strange Stories on a sample of healthy
children, has yielded a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α) = 0.65
(Hayward and Homer, 2017). This coefficient (Cronbach, 1951)
is a reliability measure of the intercorrelation among the items
composing a test; according to Devellis (2012), an α between
0.60 and 0.70 should be considered undesirable or minimally
acceptable.
Substantially the same argument can be done for other,
similar tests like, for example, those developed by Champagne-
Lavau et al. (2012) and Champagne-Lavau and Charest (2015),
who used open questions about a speaker’s ironic intent as an
assessment of ToM in patients with schizophrenia.
What we want to argue is that to conflate or reduce the notion
of pragmatics into the (wider) notion of ToM is theoretically
unsound and may cause methodological confusion in the
relevant empirical research. Of course there are relationships
between the two faculties but they nonetheless remain such:
two distinct faculties of the human mind whose roles, domains
of intervention, and ways of functioning overlap but are
not identical. That ToM plays a role in communication can
hardly be denied. Nevertheless, recent studies showed that ToM
alone cannot explain the performance of children (Bosco and
Gabbatore, 2017a,b) and of persons with schizophrenia (Bosco
et al., 2012) at a variety of pragmatic tasks. Furthermore, the
impairments of pragmatics and ToM in schizophrenia do not
overlap completely (Bambini et al., 2016; Parola et al., 2018). As
will be discussed in the next session, to use the comprehension
of pragmatic tasks, including irony or the comprehension of
figurative language, as a straightforward measure of ToM raises
problems of content validity: therefore, different tasks should be
used in the empirical practice to investigate the two constructs.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRAGMATICS
AND THEORY OF MIND
Studies of Children With Typical and
Atypical Development
Several studies in the developmental domain (Ryder and
Leinonen, 2003; Bosco et al., 2006, 2013; Loukusa et al., 2007;
Glenwright and Pexman, 2010) found that pragmatic abilities
improve with age, yielding, among the rest, a progressively
better management of indirect speech acts (Bosco and Bucciarelli,
2008), deceits (Bussey, 1999), and irony (Filippova and Astington,
2008). Children begin to exploit language to lie at about 3 years
of age (Lewis, 1993) and their ability to handle lies of increasing
difficulty grows during the pre-school and school period (see
Talwar and Crossman, 2011). Furthermore, they can typically
recognize ironic utterances at around 6 years of age (Dews
and Winner, 1997; Harris and Pexman, 2003) or sometimes
even earlier (Loukusa and Leinonen, 2008; Angeleri and Airenti,
2014).
Like pragmatics, ToM also undergoes significant
improvement during childhood (Wellman and Liu, 2004),
with the acquisition of first-order (Wimmer and Perner, 1983)
and, later, second-order abilities (Perner and Wimmer, 1985). Its
development continues through adolescence (Dumontheil et al.,
2010; Apperly, 2012; Bosco et al., 2014b, 2016).
As far as the relationship between ToM and pragmatics
is concerned, several authors have stressed that the ability to
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understand someone’s mental states and their relation with
behavior is an undisputed requirement of human communication
(Happé and Loth, 2002; Sperber and Wilson, 2002; Tirassa
et al., 2006a,b; Bosco et al., 2009; Cummings, 2015). For
example, the ability to deceive in communication has been
commonly explained based on the ability to understand and
foresee the interlocutor’s mental states (Peskin, 1996; Polak
and Harris, 1999; Lee, 2000; Ma et al., 2015). The same
holds for irony (Sullivan et al., 1995). Nilsen et al. (2011),
for example, found a correlation between the development of
verbal irony and second-order ToM, whereby children around
8 years of age performed similarly to adults in acknowledging
that listeners require contextual knowledge to comprehend
irony.
Several studies (Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli,
2008; Bosco et al., 2013, 2015) found that understanding irony
is typically more difficult to children than deceits, explaining
such difference in terms of the comparative complexity of the
inferential processes involved. In both cases the contents of the
utterance do not correspond to the speaker’s private knowledge;
however, in irony, but not in deceit, they also contradict the
knowledge which is shared between the interlocutors. Winner
and Leekman (1991) proposed that the different degrees of
difficulty experienced by children with the two kind of tasks may
depend on deceit requiring first-order reasoning about beliefs,
and irony requiring inferences about the speaker’s beliefs about
the listener’s beliefs, i.e., second-order ToM (see also Hancock
et al., 2000). Indeed, Sullivan et al. (1995) found that children start
to distinguish lies from jokes at around the age of 7, following
the acquisition of the capacity to attribute second-order mental
states.
Still, the exact role of ToM in children’s pragmatic
performance is not completely clear. In line with the literature
discussed above, Bosco and Gabbatore (2017a) found a
correlation between children’s performance at ToM tasks and
their ability to handle ironies and deceits. Further investigation,
though, showed a significant role of first-order ToM in
explaining children’s performance at deceitful, but not at ironic
communicative acts. Moreover, no effect of second-order ToM
was found on children’s performance at any of the pragmatic
tasks investigated (Bosco and Gabbatore, 2017a). ToM alone thus
didn’t prove capable of explaining the pattern of performance
in sincere (the easiest), deceitful, and ironic (the most difficult
to handle) tasks. This is in line with the results of Angeleri and
Airenti (2014) to the effect that, despite a significant association
between ToM and irony comprehension, no direct effect of
ToM on humor understanding was noticeable. Such evidence
appear to be at odds with theories granting ToM (e.g., Happé,
1993), and specifically second-order ToM (e.g., Winner and
Leekman, 1991), a central role in irony comprehension and, in
general, in pragmatics. For a similar line of argumentation in
explaining children’s ability to recognize and recover different
kinds of communicative failures see also Bosco and Gabbatore
(2017b).
The interplay of pragmatic abilities and ToM has relevant
implications in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): ASD children
display a malfunctioning both of ToM (e.g., Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985) and of several aspects of pragmatic competence
(Rundblad and Annaz, 2010; Angeleri et al., 2016; see also
Happé, 1993). The most recent diagnostic criteria for ASD
(DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) include
impairments in social communication and reciprocity as well
as restricted interests and repetitive behaviors. ASD appears
to be linked to a recently described condition called Social
(pragmatic) Communication Disorder (SCD), characterized by
difficulties in using language for social purposes, recognizing
the social context of communicative interactions, understanding
non-literal language (e.g., jokes, idioms, metaphors), and using
non-verbal communicative behaviors. The two conditions share
the difficulties in social communication, but there is no sign in
SCD of the restricted interests and repetitive behaviors typical
of ASD (see also Swineford et al., 2014). Actually, one of
the main nosographic features of SCD is that it cannot be
diagnosed in the presence of ASD, a dissociation that may be
interpreted as an attempt to disentangle, instead of conflating,




Deficits of both pragmatics and ToM constitute an integral
part of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992). As far as pragmatics is
concerned, several studies have found a worsened performance
at the comprehension of communicative acts when their
literal meaning does not correspond to the speakers’ intended
meaning, as is the case of indirect speech acts (Corcoran
et al., 1995; Corcoran, 2003), irony (Parola et al., 2018), and
figurative language uses like metaphors and idioms (Langdon
et al., 2002a; Tavano et al., 2008; Schettino et al., 2010).
Persons with schizophrenia may also encounter difficulties in
the comprehension of deceits (Frith and Corcoran, 1996) and
of narratives and stories (Marini et al., 2008), in discourse
production (Haas et al., 2015), in the recognition and recovery
of failures in communication (Bosco et al., 2012), and in the
recognition of violation of Grice’s maxims (Tényi et al., 2002;
Mazza et al., 2008).
Frith (1992) was the first to propose that a deficit of
ToM could explain the cognitive and behavioral abnormalities
of schizophrenia. This hypothesis was widely confirmed (e.g.,
Corcoran et al., 1995, 1997; Frith and Corcoran, 1996; Sarfati
and Hardy-Baylé, 1999; Mazza et al., 2001; Brüne, 2005; Bosco
et al., 2009). Specifically, Frith (1992) proposed to explain
the communicative-pragmatic deficit of schizophrenia as the
consequence of a primary ToM deficit.
Following this suggestion, several studies found impairments
of ToM co-occurring with impairments of pragmatics in
a variety of tests of conversational and narrative ability
(Abu-Akel, 1999; Champagne-Lavau et al., 2009), indirect
speech acts and figurative language comprehension (Corcoran
et al., 1995; Langdon et al., 2002a,b; Brüne and Bodenstein,
2005; Mo et al., 2008; Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010;
Gavilán and García-Albea, 2011), and the recognition of
the violation of Gricean maxims and other social norms
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of communication (Corcoran and Frith, 1996; Mazza et al.,
2008).
However, in several such studies ToM was assessed
precisely with pragmatic tasks like indirect speech acts
(Corcoran et al., 1995), irony (Mitchley et al., 1998), or the
appreciation of the adherence to or violation of Gricean maxims
(Corcoran and Frith, 1996). Of course, the real extent of the
correlation between any two abilities (or impairments thereof)
can hardly be captured when they are measured with one and the
same task.
When independent measures of ToM and pragmatics are
used the results are mixed, which appears to make sense if
the two faculties are conceived of in terms of cooperation
or overlap rather than identity. Langdon et al. (2002b), for
example, investigated the issue in individuals with schizophrenia.
They used a story-comprehension task to evaluate irony and
metaphor understanding and a false belief picture-sequencing
task to evaluate ToM, The latter is a non-verbal false-belief
task composed by a set of picture cards representing a
character who, unaware of a certain event which is instead
known to the subject, acts on a false belief: goal of the task
is to reorder the cards according to the logical sequence
of events. The performance at the ToM task predicted the
performance at irony, but not at metaphor comprehension.
The authors concluded that metaphor comprehension does not
involve ToM.
In a similar study, again conducted with persons with
schizophrenia, Mo et al. (2008) used a story comprehension
task to assess irony and metaphor understanding, in conjunction
with false belief tasks to assess ToM. This time, ToM
correlated with metaphor comprehension, but not with irony
comprehension.
Champagne-Lavau and Stip (2010) examined the role of
ToM in the comprehension of indirect requests, idiomatic
(conventional) metaphorical expression, and non-idiomatic
metaphors in patients with schizophrenia. Their results suggested
that only indirect speech acts and idiomatic metaphors, but not
non-idiomatic metaphors, are related to ToM. Mazza et al. (2008)
investigated the management of Gricean conversational maxims,
with similar results.
Bosco et al. (2012) found persons with schizophrenia to
have both a ToM impairment and a difficulty to recognize
and recover from different kinds of communicative failures,
namely, in order of increasing difficulty, failure of literal meaning,
speakers’ (intended) meaning, and communicative effect (e.g.,
the failure to induce a partner to do something). While the
ability to recognize and recover from each kind of communicative
failure correlated with ToM, there was no evidence that the
latter was the variable that best explained the trend of difficulty,
and the authors suggested that a better explanation could be
provided by the increasing inferential demands underlying each
task.
Finally, recently, both Bambini et al. (2016) and Parola et al.
(2018) found no trace of ToM malfunction in a significant
percentage of patients with schizophrenia reporting pragmatic
impairment. In line with this, other studies found a ToM
malfunction with no pragmatic impairment in several clinical
conditions like bulimia nervosa (Laghi et al., 2014), alcoholism
(Bosco et al., 2014a), and non-suicidal self-injury (Laghi et al.,
2016).
Taken together, what all these data suggest is that pragmatic
impairment cannot be simply reduced to a deficit of ToM;
instead, a specific pragmatic ability appears to exist and function
comparatively independently of ToM. This is in line with theories
of human communication claiming that there exists a specific
pragmatic competence, related to ToM but not identical to it (e.g.,
Airenti et al., 1993; Tirassa, 1999; Tirassa et al., 2006a,b; Tirassa
and Bosco, 2008).
CONCLUSION
While we do not think that pragmatic tasks should be used as
straightforward measures of ToM, all the research we cited has
valuable merit in providing significant scientific and empirical
advances. We are aware that the methodological confusion
we have tried to outline reflects an insufficiently explored
relationship between the two theoretical constructs or faculties
of pragmatics and ToM. This paper should be viewed as an
attempt to highlight the magnitude of this problem in the current
literature and to provide some clarifications.
An account of the relations between pragmatics and ToM
should capture their similarities and differences as well as their
convergences and divergences. For example, both faculties appear
to require inferences; in each case, not only may or may not
such inferences involve the other domain or faculty, but they
are also related to other kinds of world knowledge, which in
turn may or may not involve the use of language or, respectively,
someone’s mental states. This may be extremely cumbersome on
both theoretical and empirical grounds.
Even if these further difficulties are left aside, the relations
between pragmatics and ToM are intricate and variable. We
have discussed the case of the Strange Stories, taken as a
valuable instance of the many tasks (and underlying perspectives)
where the two faculties heavily intertwine. A case in which
they can instead be kept reasonably distinct is conversational
implicatures, where a listener may infer a speaker’s intended
meaning from what is left unsaid, rather than from what is
said. Specifically, scalar implicatures rely on quantifiers such
as some, all, and so on. An example is “On the cover of
my book, some of the pictures are birds,” whose everyday
interpretation appears to imply that not all the pictures are
birds. This example belongs to a set of stimuli used by
Horowitz et al. (2017) to investigate the ability to deal with
implicatures in TD children using sets of pictures of book
covers, each featuring (a) four items of the same kind (e.g.,
four cats) (b) four items of another kind (e.g., dogs), and (c)
two items of a new set and two items repeated from one
of the other book covers (e.g., two birds and two cats). In
the example presented above, no assumptions about mental
states or intentions seem to be required, thus making the
capacity to understand implicatures rely on inferential processes
only. However, this consideration depends on the nature of
the stimuli: in case the task has to do with mental states,
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of course, such process might involve also ToM abilities. This
issue deserves further empirical investigation in order to be
clarified.
Based on the available empirical literature and on the
theoretical considerations briefly outlined above, we conclude
that pragmatics is a faculty or construct distinct from ToM and
that, while the two do partially overlap, none can be simply
considered a sub-component of the other.
To avoid any confusion, it seems necessary to investigate them
with distinct empirical tasks. The precise nature of the relation
between pragmatics and ToM – more specifically, between
different facets of pragmatics and different facets of ToM – is
far from clear and further research will be needed in order to
disentangle the issue.
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